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Abstract

This paper is a reflection on the author’s experience of translating Martin Heidegger into
Filipino. It first addresses the questions of principles underlying the act of translation, such
as those of fidelity (to both source and target languages, original author and translator), as
well as the role of the translator as an intermediary between the original author and the
readers. Then it demonstrates examples of his experience of translating selected key terms
and passages in Heidegger—such as sein, stellen, Ereignis, and their cognates—indicating
the difficulties as well as the challenges that arise in the work of translation. A notable
problem or challenge is the absence in Filipino (as in other Austronesian languages) of the
verb “to be,” one of the most important subjects of philosophical inquiry in the Western
tradition. It ends by reflecting on this experience of translation, noting how even the
German concept of Übersetzen and that of the Filipino salin may lend themselves to a
“fusion of horizons,” and how, in the Heideggerian sense, translation may be said to stand
higher than the original.
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IN TRANSLATING TEXTS WITH PRACTICAL OBJECTIVES (such as in the case of a

scientific experiment or a user’s manual for a kitchen appliance), one does not need
to look back to the source language for as long as the practical objective is indeed
achieved. One can even completely ignore the source language. Even the target
language is not as important for as long as the practical results are realized. One
can allow for a little imperfection here and there, in grammar or construction, as
long as the intended goals are met.
But not so in the case of translating a literary or philosophical text. Here, one
has to keep looking back to the source language. And not only look back: one has
to keep looking back and forth, between source and target languages for fidelity
in translation is not one-way—one has to be faithful to both source and target
languages. Without this two-way fidelity, one can do violence to both the original
author or text and the intended audience or target language.
The question of fidelity in translation, however, is not just one about the object
of fidelity, but what exactly is meant by it, if not indeed whether one should take
fidelity in a simplistic way. Susan Jill Levine, for example, reminds us that the only
way to render the old translation adage, traduttore, traditore, is to be “a faithfully
unfaithful translator” (85). Thus, a translation becomes faithful by being unfaithful,
and is hence not simply another version of the original, but a “subversion” (88).
This insight is not quite unlike what one hears from within the hermeneutic
tradition, namely, that the original text remains the same only by being interpreted
differently each time. When the translator or interpreter does not bring in her own
originality in the work of translation, she ends up with something that is lifeless, a
mere repetition of the original that could otherwise have simply been carried out
by a recording machine. Being faithfully unfaithful, remaining the same by always
being different—these are no mere play of words, but an indication of the complex
and dynamic character of the act of translation, that it is as creative a work as the
writing of original texts.
The issue of how we are to understand this back-and-forth glance, this
intermediary role of the translator, indeed the very possibility of translation itself, is
understandably contentious. One extreme position is that translation itself (taken
in this sense of the to-and-fro glance, this double fidelity) is impossible. The other
extreme perhaps is one where the translator assumes he is not in any way bound by
either the source or target language, and therefore proceeds with the work in any
way he wants.
If we are to follow Aristotle’s practical advice on how to find the right measure
between two extremes, then we might do well to stay closer to the harder extreme
(1109b, 1-5), which is to say that we never lose sight of the impossibility of translation,
even as we are driven by its necessity, and hence make it possible—possible yet
never final (and hence the impossibility). “Translation is forever impossible and
forever necessary,” says Edward Seidensticker, alluding to Allen Tate (153). One
might say that this double glance of the translator is directed not only to the source
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and target languages, but also to the impossibility and necessity of translation. The
translator’s fidelity is also the honest recognition of the impossibility as well as the
surrender to its necessity. In an eloquent confession, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
says, “Translation is the most intimate act of reading. I surrender to the text when
I translate” (201).
It is within this context of impossibility and necessity, this double glance of the
translator, that I wish to reflect on my experience of translating Heidegger. Taking a
position that is close to the harder extreme, George Steiner himself maintains that
Heidegger is virtually untranslatable, insisting that Heidegger translations should
always be bilingual. Citing the 1955 lecture “Was ist das—die Philosophie?”, Steiner,
whose English translation appears in a bilingual edition, notes: “This ought to be
the case with all of Heidegger’s writings, as recourse to the special terminology
and grammatical structure of the original is virtually indispensable” (19). Steiner is
right in pointing to the uniqueness of Heidegger in the history of thought, which
consists in not only the inseparability of his thinking from the language he uses,
but also the way he relates himself to that particular language, and to language in
general.
How does Heidegger stand in relation to language? Perhaps the most telling
passage in response to this question is the one we find in “Building Dwelling
Thinking,” whose formulation is at once crucially substantial as it is profoundly
eloquent that quoting it here in extenso would be deemed justified:
It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we
respect language’s own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages
round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting
of spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of
language, while in fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is
before all else man’s subversion of this relation of dominance that drives
his nature into alienation. That we retain a concern for care in speaking is
all to the good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still serves us
even then only as a means of expression. Among all the appeals that we
human beings, on our part, can help to be voiced, language is the highest
and everywhere the first. (146)
The above passage tells us quite clearly that Heidegger radically distinguishes his
own understanding and experience of language from its dominant interpretation,
which sees language merely as an instrument, and mainly an instrument of human
communication (i.e., the instrumental and anthropological interpretation of
language). We need to recognize, however, that in that passage, Heidegger uses
the word “language” not in its ontic sense (i.e., in the sense of an actual, particular
linguistic system, such as Japanese, Swahili, or French), but rather in its ontological
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sense (i.e., what makes a particular language language, the being-language of every
language, just as we speak of the being human or humanity of human beings).
Proceeding from such an understanding and experience of language, what is to
be said then of the work of translation? Insofar as translation happens through and
in language, the translator then will not see her work as simply the transmittal of
some intelligible content between two instruments, and that she as translator is in
full command and control over these instruments. Rather, if ever there is to be talk
of instrumentality, the translator becomes herself the instrument of this transmittal
insofar as she listens to language, and speaks—translates—only as she hears, is
spoken to, beforehand. Such a listening to language implies intimacy, about which
we heard Spivak speak above and, still in another passage, says:
First then, the translator must surrender to the text. . . . no amount of
tough talk can get around the fact that translation is the most intimate
act of reading. Unless the translator has earned the right to become the
intimate reader, she cannot surrender to the text, cannot respond to the
special call of the text. (205)
The above considerations of double fidelity, between intimacy and surrender,
between two languages brought into an encounter by translation, shape my own
attempts at translating Heidegger into Filipino (here we recall Gadamer’s concept
of the Horizontverschmelzung, or “fusion of horizons” [311]). In what follows I
present three examples as representative of the challenges that I face in translating
Heidegger into Filipino, as well as two tables of further sample translations for
which, given the limits of space, I could no longer provide explanations.

“sein,” “das Sein,” “ein Seiendes”
Easily the most difficult problem facing anyone attempting to translate
Heidegger into Filipino is the absence of the existential verb “to be” (Ger. sein) in the
latter, a lack it shares with other Austronesian languages. This is perhaps the most
challenging problem given that the single most important question for Heidegger
is the Seinsfrage itself, the question of being. The translation of Heidegger into
English is difficult enough, as Derrida translator Alan Bass notes:
While the concept of Being belongs to the entire metaphysical tradition, its
translation into English has become particularly difficult since Heidegger’s
analysis of it. German and French share the advantage that their infinitives
meaning to be (sein, être) can also be used as substantives that mean Being
in general. Further, in each language the present participle of the infinitive
(seiend, étant) can also be used as a substantive meaning particular
beings. No such advantage exists in English, and since Heidegger is always
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concerned with the distinction between Sein (être, Being in general) and
Seiendes (étant, beings) the correct translation of these substantives
becomes the first problem for any consideration of Heidegger. (xix)
In translating the German sein (or the English “to be”) into Filipino, I find myself
following the Filipino Jesuit philosopher Roque J. Ferriols. Born in 1924 and, as of
the time of this writing, still teaching at the Ateneo de Manila University, Ferriols is
credited for having been perhaps the first ever to teach philosophy using Filipino as
the medium of instruction in the late 1960s, and doing so in the face of suspicion or
doubt, if not hostility, from some of his colleagues (see Ferriols, Que and Rodriguez
). In expressing the concept or experience of being or existence, Ferriols uses the
word “meron” (a contraction of “mayroon,” which means “there is,” but literally is
composed of may, “there is,” and roon, “there”). In ordinary usage, “meron” is used
in utterances like the following: “Meron bang tubig sa banyo?” (Is there water in
the bathroom?) “Meron ka bang barya?” (Do you have coins?). In philosophical
discussions, one might say the following: “Meron ba talagang Diyos?” (Is there
really a God?) “Meron akong dangal bilang tao.” (I have dignity as a human being.)
(See Ferriols 4-6.)
On several occasions, whether during class discussions or my personal
conversations with him, Ferriols made it clear that “meron” is not to be taken
simply as the equivalent of “being.” To begin with, Ferriols would consider it a
mistake to assume a one-to-one correspondence between languages. Nonetheless,
the English word “being,” the German “sein,” and the Filipino “meron” to some
extent do share the meaning of existence, each in its own way, each with its own
possibilities and limitations. In Ferriols’s usage, the conjugation of “meron” would
allow one to say the following: “Ang pagmemeron ng tao” (The being of the human
being), “Ang pagmemeron ng mga nagmemeron” (The being of beings), “Hindi
maaaring magmeron ang wala” (What is not, cannot be).
It is interesting to note that the word “mayroon” is almost the literal equivalent of
the German “Dasein,” which in ordinary usage means “existence,” but in Heidegger
refers specifically to the being of the human being. Literally, “Dasein” means “there
being,” where “da” is “there” (or “here”), and “sein” of course is “being” or “to be.”
Both the ordinary German usage of “Dasein” and the Filipino “mayroon”/“meron”
point to the experience of a “there.” There is something out there, one might say.
And the human being, the one who experiences the presencing of something out
there, and utters such an experience, himself or herself stands out there, in the
open, where, in Heidegger, the “there” or the “open” is itself the very world in which
Dasein always already finds itself (“Sein und Zeit” 17). Heidegger also points to the
fact that the word “existence” literally means to stand out (L. ex, “out,” sistere, “take
a stand”), and therefore reserves the word Existenz for Dasein, for only Dasein
exists, only Dasein stands out there (“Sein und Zeit” 177).
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Perhaps equally interesting and significant is the happy discovery that Ferriols
once shared in one of his philosophy classes, namely, that philosophy professors
in Indonesia use the Bahasa Indonesian word ada to speak of being, even as, like
Filipino and other Austronesian languages, that language does not have the verb
“to be.” Now, ada in Bahasa Indonesia is the equivalent of “mayroon” or “meron”
in Filipino. Furthermore, the same word, “ada,” actually exists in one of the major
Philippine languages, namely, Ilocano, which means the same as it does in Bahasa
Indonesia.
A closer consideration of may and mayroon might make us realize that may
alone means “there is,” that is, may alone utters the existence of something, and
that strictly speaking it does not mean “to have”; it does not originally express
possession. It is enough to say, “May Diyos,” or “May tubig,” to say “There is God,”
or “There is water,” respectively. When one says, “May tubig ako,” may in itself does
not mean “to have.” Only in the additional information provided by ako do we
understand the secondary meaning of possession. Thus, “May tubig ako” means,
“There is water, and it’s in my possession.” The primary indication is the existence
of water, the secondary one is my possession of it. Thus, too, “Ako may tubig, ikaw
wala,” would mean, “There is water in my possession, there is no water in yours.” This
is also expressed in adjectives, which in most cases begin with the prefix ma- (e.g.,
maganda, matalino, mabait, mayaman). Maganda, for example, is a contraction of
may ganda, which is to say, “There is beauty.” Thus, Maganda si Maria would mean,
“There is beauty in the case of Maria,” or simply, “Maria is beautiful.” There is Maria,
there is beauty, and the two belong together.
Let me now turn to a second example in translating Heidegger into Filipino,
namely, the verb “stellen” and its cognates.

“Stellen” and Its Cognates
In 1953, Heidegger delivered a public lecture titled “Die Frage nach der Technik”
(The Question Concerning Technology) at the University of Technology in Munich.
That lecture proved to be seminal and had far-reaching influence especially on the
philosophy of technology. One indication of such influence is that even the more
recent volumes on the “new waves” in the philosophy of technology could not quite
do away with him, “whose ghost still looms” (Olsen, Selinger, Riis xi).
Perhaps the most important group of key words in that text is the one based on
the root word “stellen.” In a lengthy footnote, translator William Lovitt explains
this group of words, which illustrate how the connectedness of the cognates in the
original German is impossible to translate into English:
The verb stellen (to place or set) has a wide variety of uses. It can mean to
put in place, to order, to arrange, to furnish or supply, and, in a military
context, to challenge or engage. Here Heidegger sees the connotations
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of herausfordern (to challenge, to call forth, to demand out hither) as
fundamentally determinative of the meaning of stellen, and this remains
true throughout his ensuing discussion. The translation of stellen with “to
set upon” is intended to carry this meaning. The connotations of setting
in place and of supplying that lie within the word stellen remain strongly
present in Heidegger’s repeated use of the verb hereafter, however, since
the “setting-upon” of which it speaks is inherently a setting in place so as
to supply. Where these latter meanings come decisively to the fore, stellen
has been translated with “to set” or “to set up,” or, rarely, with “to supply.”
Stellen embraces the meanings of a whole family of verbs: bestellen (to
order, command; to set in order), vorstellen (to represent), sicherstellen (to
secure), nachstellen (to entrap), verstellen (to block or disguise), herstellen
(to produce, to set here), darstellen (to present or exhibit), and so on. In
these verbs the various nuances within stellen are reinforced and made
specific. All these meanings are gathered together in Heidegger’s unique
use of the word that is pivotal for him, Ge-stell (Enframing). (15)
The impossibility of translating Heidegger into English—in the case of the word
“stellen” and its cognates—is not diminished in the case of Filipino translation. But
the necessity of translation bids us to persist, to the best that we can. Here then are
my proposed translations of this key group of words:
stellen, “itakdang-ayos.” As we saw in Lovitt’s commentary, the root word
stellen is a verb that has a number of meanings. In my translation I have chosen to
emphasize its sense of “setting” or “setting upon” (pagtatakda) as well as “setting or
putting in order” (pagsasaayos). I therefore translate stellen as “itakdang-ayos.” The
following paragraph serves as an example:
Das bäuerliche Tun fordert den Ackerboden nicht heraus. Im Säen
des Korns gibt es die Saat den Wachstumskräften anheim und hütet
ihr Gedeihen. Inzwischen ist auch die Feldbestellung in den Sog eines
andersgearteten Bestellens geraten, das die Natur stellt. Es stellt sie im Sinne
der Herausforderung. Ackerbau ist jetzt motorisierte Ernährungsindustrie.
Die Luft wird auf die Abgabe von Stickstoff hin gestellt, der Boden auf Erze,
das Erz z. B. auf Uran, dieses auf Atomenergie, die zur Zerstörung oder
friedlichen Nutzung entbunden werden kann. (Heidegger, “Die Frage nach
der Technik” 16)
The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the
sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth
and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the
field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets
upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture
is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen,
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the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set
upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction
or for peaceful use. (Heidegger, “Poetry, Language, Thought” 15)
Hindi sapilitang hinahamon ng gawain ng magsasaka ang lupang sinasaka.
Sa paghahasik ng mga punla, isinusuko ang mga ito sa mga bisa ng pagtubo
at iniingatan ang kanilang pagtubo at pagdami. Samantala ang pagpapatubo
at pagpapataba ng lupa ay napasasailalim ng ibang uri ng pagsasaayos
[Bestellen], na nagtatakdang-ayos [stellt] sa kalikasan. Ang pagsasaayos na
ito ay nagtatakda sa kalikasan sa pakahulugan ng sapilitang paghamon dito.
Ngayon, ang agrikultura ay ang mekanisadong industriya ng pagkain. Ang
hangin ay itinatakdang-ayos upang makapagpalabas ng nitroheno, gaya ng
pagtatakdang-ayos sa lupa upang makapagpalabas ng mineral, ang mineral
naman upang makapagpalabas ng uranio, halimbawa; itinatakdang-ayos
naman ang uranio upang makalikha ng atomikong enerhiya, na maaaring
pakawalan tungo sa pagwasak o upang gamitin sa kapayapaan.
Let me now turn to my third and final example in translating Heidegger into
Filipino, namely, Ereignis.

“Ereignis,” “sich ereignen,” “zueignen,” “übereignen,” etc.
In ordinary German, the reflexive verb sich ereignen means “to happen,” and its
nominative cognate, Ereignis, “event.” In Heidegger, however, the word acquires a
far more profound—and even obscure—meaning. Furthermore, Ereignis is, without
doubt, one of the most central concepts in Heidegger. It is no coincidence either
that it is also one of the most difficult Heideggerian terms to translate, whether
into English or any other language. As if the word on its own is not enigmatic
enough, it appears in the title of a book that Heidegger wrote between 1936 and
1938, but for which he specifically gave strict instructions that it not be published
within his lifetime. The book was published for the first time in German in 1989
(thirteen years after his death in 1976), and in English translation in 1999. Entitled
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), it appears as volume number 65 in the
Gesamtausgabe or Collected Works.
A clear indication of the difficulty of translating this word can be gleaned from
the circumstances and motivations behind the second English translation. The first
English translation was carried out by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly and was
released in 1999 as Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). Emad and Maly
decided to coin a new word, “enown,” in order to translate the verb sich ereignen,
and thus “enowning” for the noun Ereignis. Among the reasons that led Emad and
Maly to opt for a neologism was that the coined word “enown” expresses what is
spoken in the German prefix er- and the root word eigen:
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We found a good approximation to Ereignis in the word enowning. Above
all it is the prefix en- in this word that opens the possibility for translating
Ereignis, insofar as this prefix conveys the sense of “enabling,” “bringing into
condition of,” or “welling up of.” Thus, in conjunction with owning, this prefix
is capable of getting across a sense of an “owning” that is not “an owning of
something” (xx).
We can also add that the word enowning has the advantage in that it follows the
morphology of English verbs like “enable,” “enlighten,” “ennoble,” and “empower,”
making it easier to decline or conjugate (unlike the more common translation,
“event of appropriation,” found in most secondary Heideggerian literature).
Highlighting the difficulty in and controversy surrounding the translation of
Ereignis by Emad and Maly, an entirely new translation of the Beiträge appears 13
years after the first, in 2012. The new translators, Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela
Vallega-Neu, did not hide their dissatisfaction with Emad and Maly’s translation,
which motivated them to translate it anew. Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu opted to
use the more common meaning of Ereignis, which is simply event.
How do I now propose to translate Ereignis into Filipino? I would like to capture
both the sense of event as well as the owning or propriation. Thus I propose that we
use kaganapan (“event,” which also contains the word ganap, meaning “complete”
or “fulfilled”), as well as angkop (“proper”). The word angkin (“to own”) is another
alternative, but if we are to avoid a lengthy formula such as kaganapan ng pagangkop-angkin, and for the sake of simplicity choose only one verb between angkop
and angkin, we can argue for angkop as being more inclusive, containing within it
the sense of “owning” (angkin). For we can only own what is proper to us. What
is proper belongs to us as something appropriate. Thus, we can render Ereignis
into Filipino as kaganapan ng pag-angkop, and sich ereignen as maganap ang pagangkop. Let me now offer some examples:
Example 1:
Das Ereignis übereignet den Gott an den Menschen, indem es diesen dem
Gott zueignet. Diese übereignende Zueignung is Ereignis . . .…” (Heidegger,
“Beiträge zur Philosophie [Vom Ereignis]” 26)
Enowning owns god over to man in that enowning owns man to god. This
“owning to” that “owns over” is enowning . . . (Heidegger, “Contributions to
Philosophy: From Enowning” 20).
The event consigns [übereignet] god to the human being by assigning
[zueignet] the human being to god. This consigning assignment is the
appropriating event [Diese ubereignende Zueignung ist Ereignis] . . .
(Heidegger “Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event” 23)
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Iniaangkop-kaloob ng kaganapan ng pag-angkop ang diyos sa mga tao sa
pamamagitan ng paghahabilin nito ng mga tao sa diyos. Itong pag-aangkopkaloob ay ang kaganapan ng pag-angkop.
Example 2:
Die Flucht der Götter muß erfahren und ausgestanden werden. Dieses
Beständnis gründet die fernste Nähe zum Ereignis. Dieses Ereignis ist die
Wahrheit des Seyns (Heidegger, “Hei Beiträge zur Philosophie [Vom Ereignis]”
27).
The flight of gods must be experienced and endured. The steadfast enduring
grounds the most remote nearness to enowning. This enowning is the truth
of be-ing (Heidegger, “Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning” 20).
The absconding of the gods must be experienced and endured.
This endurance grounds the most remote closeness to the event.
This event is the truth of being (Heidegger, “Contributions to Philosophy: Of
the Event” 24).
Kailangang danasin at tiisin ang paglikas ng mga diyos. Itong pagtagal-tiis
ay siyang nagtatatag sa pinakamalayong kalapitan sa kagananapan ng pagangkop. Itong kaganapan ng pag-angkop ay ang katotohanan ng sinaunang
pagmemeron.
Below are two tables showing further examples of translations of Heidegger into
Filipino, one of a passage from “Die Frage nach der Technik,” and another of a list
of some key Heideggerian terms. The limits of space no longer allow me to explain
each translation the way I did in the three foregoing examples (see table 1 and 2).
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FILIPINO
(“ANG KATANUNGAN
TUNGKOL SA
TEKNOLOHIYA”)
Dito nakasalalay ang lahat—na

Alles liegt daran, daß
wir das Her-vor-bringen
in seiner ganzen Weite
und zugleich im Sinne
der Griechen denken.
Ein Her-vor-bringen,
ποιησις, ist nicht nur
das handwerkliche
Verfertigen, nicht nur das
künstlerisch-dichtende
zum-Scheinen- und insBild-Bringen. Auch die
φύσις, das von-sich-her
Aufgehen, ist ein Her-vorbringen, ist ποίησις. Die
φύσις ist sogar ποίησις
im höchsten Sinne. Denn
das φύσει Anwesende
hat den Aufbruch des
Her-vor-bringens, z.B.
das Aufbrechen der Blüte
ins Erblühen, in ihr selbst
(εν έαυτώ). Dagegen
hat das handwerklich
und künstlerisch Hervor-gebrachte, z.B.
die Silberschale, den
Aufbruch des Her-vorbringens nicht in ihm
selbst, sondern in einem
anderen (έν άλλω),
im Handwerker und
Künstler. (15)

It is of utmost
importance that we
think bringing-forth in
its full scope and at the
same time in the sense
in which the Greeks
thought it. Not only
handcraft manufacture,
not only artistic and
poetical bringing into
appearance and concrete
imagery, is a bringingforth, poiésis. Physis also,
the arising of something
from out of itself, is a
bringing-forth, poiésis.
Physis is indeed poiésis
in the highest sense.
For what presences by
means of physis has the
bursting open belonging
to bringing-forth, e.g.,
the bursting of a blossom
into bloom, in itself (en
hautoi). In contrast, what
is brought forth by the
artisan or the artist, e.g.,
the silver chalice, has the
bursting open belonging
to bringingforth not in
itself, but in another (en
alloi), in the craftsman or
artist. (10-11)

ating isipin ang paghahatidsa-harap [Her-vor-bringen] sa
kabuoan ng lawak nito at sabay
sa pakahulugan ng mga Griyego.
Ang isang paghahatid-sa-harap,
ποιησις, ay hindi lamang ang
paglikha sa pamamagitan
ng kamay, hindi lamang ang
paghahatid sa pagpapakita at
sa larawan sa pamamagitan
ng sining at tula. Maging
ang φύσις, ang paglitaw/
pag-ahon sa sariling bisa, ay
isang paghahatid-sa-harap, ay
ποίησις. Masasabi pa nga na
ang φύσις ay sa pinakamataas
na kahulugan nito. Sapagkat
ang nagpepresensiya sa φύσις
ay nagtataglay ng pagbubukas
[Aufbruch] ng paghahatid sa
harap, sa pamumukadkad ng
bulaklak, sa pamumulaklak
nito, sa sarili nito mismo (εν
έαυτώ). Salungat dito, sa kaso
ng naihatid-sa-harap/nalikha/
nagawa [Her-vor-gebrachte]
sa pamamagitan ng kamay at
sa artistikong paraan, hal. ang
pinilakang kalis, ang pagbukaslaya [Aufbruch] ng paghahatidsa-harap ay wala sa sarili nito
mismo, kundi sa ibang bagay
(έν άλλω), sa manggagawa at sa
alagad ng sining.

Table 1. Sample Translation: “Die Frage nach der Technik”
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GERMAN

ENGLISH

FILIPINO

Sein

to be

magmeron

das Sein

being

pagmemeron

ein Seiendes

a being

isang nagmemeron

das Seyn

beyng

sinaunang
pagmemeron

Ereignis

event, enowning, event
of appropriation

kaganapan ng
pag-angkop

das Anwesen des
Anwesenden

the presencing of that
which presences

ang pag-iral ng umiiral;
ang pagpepresensiya
ng nagpepresensiya

Dasein

Dasein

Dasein

Ge-stell

enframing

pagsasangkahon

Geviert

fourfold

sang-apat

In-der-Welt-sein

being-in-the-world

pagsasadaigdig [cf.
sumakabilambuhay,
sumalangit, ergo,
sumadaigdig]

Table 2. Table of Some Key Heideggerian Terms

Conclusion: Carrying Across to the Other Side, and Pouring Over
The translation of a German text into Filipino involves the fusion of not only
the horizons of the two languages themselves (to borrow the famous formulation
of Gadamer), but also the very understanding of translation itself. In the work
of translation, the horizons of the two languages are both challenged to expand
themselves. It is never just a one-way affair where the language of the original text
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is perceived to colonize the target languages. Rather, in the act of translation, the
target language, too, approaches the source language and in so doing becomes
capable of enriching it as well. We are aware, for example, how at times the author
of a poem is startled by the new meaning or insight that arises when her work is
read (orally) by another.
My initial attempts at translating Heidegger into Filipino have also enabled me
to become aware of this productive encounter not only between two languages,
but also between these two languages’ understanding of translation itself, both as
an act and a process. Allow me then to conclude this essay by reflecting on this
encounter in and through translation.
Listening closely to what the word übersetzen says, Heidegger notes how
translation is akin to the ferrying over to the other side of the river. Übersetzen in
fact has at least two meanings in German. In the first usage, the word (in this case
a non-separable verb) simply means to translate. In the second, the word means
“to ferry or to transport across” (this time, it is used a separable verb, e.g. “Das Boot
setzt Passagiere über den Fluss,” meaning “The boat ferries passengers across the
river”). One has to leave one’s own shore, as it were, traverse the distance between
two languages, and in translation be uprooted and transposed into the very soil of
the other shore. And yet in the constant movement between uprooting and taking
roots, in the endless to-and-fro play between languages, Heidegger recognizes a
shared essential source:
And while I was translating, I often felt as though I were wandering back and
forth between two different realities, such that at moments a radiance shone
on me which let me sense that the wellspring of reality from which those
two fundamentally different languages arise was the same. (“On the Way to
Language” 24)
Walter Benjamin seems to be pointing to the Same when he speaks of “pure
language” and the “kinship of languages,” noting how “this special kinship holds
because languages are not strangers to one another, but are, a priori and apart from
all historical relationships, interrelated in what they want to express” (255).
On the other hand, the Filipino word for translation, salin, literally means “pour,”
as in to pour from one container to another (and not in the sense of the pouring
of rain, blessings, and the like). When water, for example, is poured from a jug to
a drinking glass, or when rice is poured from a sack to a storage bin, the content
remains the same, but it takes on a different shape on the whole, even as its parts
remain essentially the same. In the pouring of water from a jug to a drinking glass,
the shape of the water as a whole changes, from that of the original container, to
that of the new one. But the water essentially and substantially remains the same.
Of course, some experience in the storage of liquid substances and even just
a bit of scientific knowledge would tell us that it makes a whole lot of difference
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to have the right kind of container for this or that sort of liquid. These days, for
example, most consumers are quite aware that it is important to use a BPA -free
plastic water bottle in order to keep the water safe. Pouring water from a glass
pitcher into a BPA -laden plastic water bottle changes the quality of the water itself,
from one of being safe and nutritious, to that of being toxic or hazardous to health.
Wine connoisseurs can likewise speak endlessly about the merits of storing vintage
wine in oak barrels, and how the resulting product is profoundly affected in terms
of color, taste and texture. So, too, in the matter of translation, regarding languages
as simply being neutral containers that cannot affect the quality of their contents
cannot be taken at face value without running the risk of making simplistic
something that is actually complex. In his analysis of William Gass’s translation of
Rilke, for example, J.M. Coetzee says, “A human language is not a neutral code like
a computer language. To be ‘English’ is to be embedded in the English language and
the English language’s way of seeing the world. If Hölderlin had ‘been English’ in
any sense, he could not but have written a different poem” (69).
It is thus with some caution that one can say that the Filipino experience of
translation seems to have a stronger sense of the text as remaining essentially and
substantially the same despite the transfer that happens between two language
containers. In the German experience, on the other hand, while indeed the
substance remains the same, the emphasis seems to be more on the requirement
of uprooting, and the taking roots in the other shore. The difference, as well as the
sameness, between two languages in their encounter in translation points to their
actuality and at the same time indicates their possibility.
In one of the most famous and thought-provoking lines in Being and Time,
Heidegger says, “Higher than actuality stands possibility” (34). Insofar as the
possibilities for translation are infinite, perhaps we can paraphrase and say: Higher
than the original stands the translation. Apart from possibly being construed as
the height of arrogance and a careless, scandalous claim, this proposition surely
directly goes against tradition, which universally demands that a translation be
faithful to the original. The original remains to be the standard against which all
translations are to be measured. And without the original, translations simply
cannot be. Benjamin himself expects no less than transparency in translation, so
that the original text may be clearly illumined as it wishes to show itself: “A real
translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but
allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon
the original all the more fully” (260).
So in what sense can we say that higher than the original stands the translation?
Not in the sense of superiority or being simply better, but in the sense that the
translation as a possibility stands higher than the original as an actuality. Of
course one can immediately object and say that the original as an actuality is never
really fixed, but always open. But precisely the openness is translation itself. The
possibility for understanding the original texts rests on translation. The original
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is preserved by and through translation. Moreover, there is no more certain test
of understanding the original than the ability to translate it in one’s own language.
There is also no greater proof of the importance of a text than the necessity of its
translation. A great text always will demand to be translated. Benjamin also sees this
when he says that “to some degree, all great texts contain their potential translation
between the lines” (263). This “potential translation,” contained between the lines
of the original text, is precisely its possibility, which stands higher than its actuality.
And so, too, every translation will be surpassed by yet another, as the older one may
no longer be able to address its audience.
There is perhaps the possibility of understanding translation that recognizes at
the same time, on the one hand, the primacy of the original as that which remains
to be the measure of every translation and, on the other hand, the necessity of
translation on which the very survival of the original depends. To put it in another
way, every great text contains within it its potential translation as its own promise
of survival. In this context we can see how, in the work of translation, the concept
of measure is used in two senses: first, in that the original is the measure of the
translation and, second, translation becomes the very measure of the survival of
the original text.
Can we read the Filipino translation between the lines of the original texts
of Heidegger? We can, for as long as the original contains this potential, for as
long it demands this possible translation and, finally, for as long as the translator
sees herself as merely responding to the demands of her own language, which in
turn demands that something foreign be translated into it. When I thus translate
Heidegger into Filipino, I am aware that my fidelity is demanded, not just to the
original language as an actuality, but perhaps even more so to the target language
as a possibility. Thus, the necessity and impossibility of translation are reconciled
only by the internal possibility contained within the original text, a possibility that
stands higher than its actuality.
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